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I.

Introduction

Dilution as a form of intrusion on a trademark has been the object of
intense consumer and competition discourses in United States. From the
United States Supreme Court decision in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,'
in 2003, to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v.
Haute Diggity Dog, LLC,2 in 2006, the concept of dilution has become
" 2009 J.D. Candidate at University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The
author would
like to thank all Comm/Ent members involved in this project for their generous assistance, and
would like to dedicate this humble achievement to the memory of her father.
1. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
2. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A v. Haute Diggity Dog, LCC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007).
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more sophisticated and its intersection with unfair competition and First
Amendment law is far from being settled.
In Moseley, the defendants opened "Victor's Secret," a retail store in a3
strip mall selling men's and women's lingerie, sex toys, and adult videos.
After being contacted by Victoria's Secret, the Moseleys changed the name
of their store to "Victor's Little Secret.",4 The trial court granted summary
judgment for plaintiffs on the dilution claim and the court of appeals
affirmed.5 The Supreme Court reversing the Court of Appeals held that
proof of actual dilution, not just likelihood of dilution is required.6
In 2006, the Trademark Dilution Revision Act ("TDRA"), Congress's
amendment of the 2005 Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA"),
substituting the "likelihood of dilution" standard for "actual dilution" did
not alleviate the trademarks owners' concerns vis-A-vis free riding, as
courts lacked an accurate direction in distinguishing between parodydisguised free riding and primarily parodic intent.
In 2006, in Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, in
applying a revised "likelihood of dilution" standard, the trial court granted
summary judgment to defendants finding no dilution by either blurring or
tarnishment.7 The court also found that consumer confusion between
"Louis Vuitton" and "Chewy Vuiton" trademarks was unlikely due to
parody.8 The Fourth Circuit affirmed. 9 As shown in more detail below, the
case illustrates how the TDRA's parody exclusion may provide dilution
immunity even for parodies incorporated into commercial products.
Furthermore, the absence of a consistent normative vision between
United States and the rest of the world (especially European Union and
Latin America) leaves courts facing a stark choice between the traditional
trademark law and a modern one that tends to transform the law's purpose
and effect. The concern is whether courts should adopt the more modest
version because the more radical option would potentially impose
substantial costs without any obvious social benefits.

3. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422-23.
4. Id. at 423.
5. Id.at 425.
6. Id. at 433.
7. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 464 F. Supp. 2d 495, 504-505
(E.D.Va., 2006) (Louis Vuitton produces luxury consumer goods such as luggage and handbags,
including a limited number of high-end pet products such as leashes and collars. Defendant, Las
Vegas dog toy maker, Haute Diggity Dog, uses "Chewy Vuiton" on stuffed toys and dog-bed
pillows in the shape of handbags. Goods are decorated in a pattern reminiscent of Louis
Vuitton's logo.)
8. Id. at 499-500.
9. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A v. Haute Diggity Dog, LCC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007).
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This note is an attempt to answer the questions of whether the courts,
by broadly interpreting the TDRA as being designed to protect freedom of
speech, allow free riders to hide behind commercial parodies and make
money by exploiting the good names and trademarks of famous marks. To
the extent such finding is positive, it formulates a test designed to alleviate
the difficulties in distinguishing the blurred line between freedom of speech
and free riding. Part II highlights the origin and evolution of antidilution
legislation in United States as well as its underlying policy goals. Part II
also examines the traditional scope of the parody defense by clarifying its
misconceptions and laying out its goals. Part III analyzes the effectiveness
and shortcomings of antidilution legislation, particularly in light of
relatively new court decisions under TDRA. Part III also examines the
economic reasons to prevent one's free riding on the fame of other's
trademarks for one's own economic benefit, in the case of parodies
incorporated in commercial trademarks. Part IV proposes a new test that
will augment the effectiveness of the TDRA and avoid confusion in courts.
Lastly, Part V provides a summary of the note and some concluding
remarks.
II. Background
A. Policy Concerns Surrounding Trademark Dilution
The concept of trademark dilution originates in Europe. 10
It
developed in the United States beginning in 1927 with Frank Schechter's
discussion of the doctrine in his article, "The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection."' 1 Schechter refers to two European cases, some of the earliest
applications of the dilution theory: an 1898 British case involving the use
of "Kodak" for bicycles and a 1924 German case involving the use of2
"Odol," a well-known mouth wash brand name that was adopted for steel.'
Schechter defines trademark dilution as the weakening of a trademark, or
"the whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the
public
13
mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods."
Traditionally, trademark law protected a mark owner from a use of his
mark on a competitive good, but provided no protection against such use on

10. Some of the earliest uses of dilution theory are attributed to courts in Great Britain and
Germany. See David S. Welkowitz, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 336 (2002).
11. Frank I. Schechter, The RationalBasis of Trademark Protection,40 HARV. L. REv. 813
(1927) (hereinafter Schechter).
12. Id. at 821-31.
13. Id. at 825.
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a non-competitive good. 14 Frank Schechter urged legal protection against
trademark dilution in cases of non-competitive goods. 15 As in house
counsel for a company who sold BVD underwear,' 6 Schechter's position
was that the law should provide a remedy for the unauthorized use of
famous marks on non-competing products, even when there is no consumer
confusion, because such uses diminish the famous marks' value. 7
Schechter observed that the economic power of a mark depends on its
"uniqueness and singularity" and concluded that preservation of these
18
qualities is "the only rational basis" for trademark protection.
Until Shechter's new theory, trademark legislation was primarily
customer-protection oriented. It applied only to those situations in which
goods were produced in a way that made them look as if they came from
the trademark holder, when in fact they came from a different source. 19
This approach corresponds more to the trademark infringement cause of
20
action.
In contrast to trademark infringement, trademark dilution is
concerned with protecting the mark. Dilution results from the "lessening of
the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,
regardless of the present or absence of (1) competition between the owner
of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion,
mistake or deception. 21 When dilution occurs, consumers are most likely
not confused or deceived, but it is the trademark owner who suffers the
harm. The policy rationale behind dilution claims is protecting the mark as
a property right of its holder.2 2 The dilution doctrine is different because it
is justified by a policy of protecting a mark itself, specifically its distinctive
quality or reputation. Thus, the leading distinction between infringement
and dilution is that the former protects consumers while the latter protects
the property right of the trademark holder.

14. Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108
YALE L.J. 1717, 1724 n.41 (May 1999) ("Courts' construction of the requisite confusion in the
early part of the century was narrow.").
15. Schechter, supra note 11, at 825.
16. Joel H. Steckel, Robert Klein & Shelley Schussheim, Dilution Through the Looking
Glass: A Marketing Look at the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, 96 TRADEMARK REP.
616 (May-June 2006).
17. Schechter, supra note 11, at 821-22.

18. Id.
19. Stacey Dogan & Mark Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 HOUSTON L. REv. 777, 789 (2004) (citing Taylor v. Carpenter, 23. F. Cas. 742, 744
(C.C.D. Mass 1844).

20. 15U.S.C.§§ 1114, 1125 (2006)
21. 15U.S.C. § 1127(2006)
22. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, H.R. Rep. No. 109-23, at 25 (2005)
(statement of Rep. Berman) ("Protection against trademark dilutions seems, in some ways, more
akin to property protection than consumer protection.").
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Trademark Dilution Legislation in United States

In 1995, Congress enacted the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
providing a remedy for dilution of famous marks.23 The FTDA provided
that the owner of a famous mark was entitled to an injunction against
24
someone who "causes dilution against the distinctive quality of a mark.",
By failing to specify the types of dilution that could be the subject of an
1125(c) claim, the FTDA created additional confusion. While dilution by
blurring as a claim of impairment to the distinctiveness of the mark was
recognized in courts, dilution by tarnishment, affecting a mark's reputation,
was controversial. (The two types of dilution will be described below.)
For instance, in Moseley, the Supreme Court indicated in dicta that the
FTDA may not recognize dilution by tamishment. 25 After 2003, some
courts and commentators interpreted the FTDA to cover only dilution by
blurring.26
The Trademark Dilution Revision Act became effective on October 6,
2006.27 The TDRA resolved the FTDA ambiguities about the scope of
dilution by clarifying that both dilution by blurring and dilution by
tarnishment are actionable. 28 According to the TDRA, dilution by blurring
is an association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name
and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.29
Dilution by tamishment is an association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation
of the famous mark.3 °
The TDRA also broadened the FTDA fair use provisions. The fair use
amendments were intended to "more clearly protect traditional First
Amendment uses, such as parody and criticism" and to "provide balance to
the law by strengthening traditional fair-use defenses." 31 After the FTDA
had created trademark infringement defenses for "comparative commercial
advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the
owner of the famous mark... [the] noncommercial use of a mark ...[and]
all forms of news reporting and news commentary,, 32 the TDRA

23.

Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98 (1996).

24.

15 U.S.C. §1125 (c) (2006).

25.
26.

Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003).
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 24:95 (4th ed. 1996).

27.

15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).

28.

15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1), (2) (2006).

29. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1) (2006).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)-(C) (2006).
31. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 152 Cong. Rec. H6963, 6965 (daily ed. Sept.
25, 2006) (remarks of Rep. Smith).
32.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2000).
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broadened this provision to include "any fair use, including nominative or
descriptive fair use identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting
upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark
owner." 33 The non-commercial use of a mark referred to in the FTDA
includes constitutionally protected speech.
In the FTDA, Congress
intended to exempt "parody, satire, editorial and
other forms of expression
34
transaction.,
commercial
a
of
part
not
that are
Congress also established six factors that the courts would use in their
dilution analysis:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and
the famous mark; (ii) the degree of inherent or acquired
distinctiveness of the famous mark; (iii) the extent to which the
owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive
use of the mark; (iv) the degree of recognition of the famous
mark; (v) whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to
create an association with the famous mark; and (vi) any actual
association between the mark or trade name and the famous
mark.35
The current federal statute also restricts dilution protection to marks
that are not only distinctive but famous. 36 The TDRA provides that "a
mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public
of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of
the mark's owner., 37 This responds in part to confusion among the courts
that have interpreted the FTDA's fame requirement. Some courts have
required a mark to be famous among the general body of consumers
nationwide. 38 Others have held that a mark can be famous for dilution

33.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C)(3)(A)(ii) (2006) (emphasis added).

34. See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1574 (S.D.
Cal. 1996) (quoting 141 Cong. Rec. S 19310, daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995 (statement of Senator

Hatch)).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006).
36. Section 43(c) lists eight non-exhaustive factors that a court may consider in determining
whether a mark is both "distinctive and famous." One factor, for example, is "the duration and

extent of advertising and publicity of the mark." 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (2000).
37. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. 2(A) (2005). A court
may "consider all relevant factors" in assessing fame, including: "(i) The duration, extent, and
geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the
owner or third parties. (ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or
services offered under the mark. (iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark." Id.
38. See Ott v. Target Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1075 (D.Minn. 2001); Savin Corp. v.
Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 450 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004); Thane Int'l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305
F.3d 894, 910 (9th Cir. 2002).
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purposes if it is extremely well known within a particular market niche.39
The TDRA effectively ends dilution protection for marks famous only in
niche markets.4 °
C.

The Parody Defense

In the trademark law context, a parody is defined as "a simple form of
entertainment conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent representation of the
trademark with the idealized image created by the mark's power. '4 1 To be
a successful defense, a parody "must both call to mind and differentiate
itself from the original," and must suggest some elements of "satire,

ridicule, joking, or amusement.
Because consumer confusion is
irrelevant in dilution claims, a defendant cannot simply argue that
consumers "get the joke. 43 Instead, the defendant must show the parody
does not harm the goodwill or distinctiveness of the mark, or that First
Amendment principles protect the parody despite any dilution.44
In enumerating the types of trademark parodies, David Bernstein and
Thomas Prochnow, distinguish among them by the degree susceptibility to
First Amendment protection.45 Specifically, parodies involving political
expression get the most protection because political speech is widely
recognized as being at the very heart of First Amendment protection.4 6
Parodies in non-traditional forums like T-shirts, posters, stickers, and
trading cards get less First Amendment protection because parodies on
these products are often used primarily to sell products rather than to
disseminate commentary.47 Lastly, purely commercial parodies receive the
39. See Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 174
(3d Cir. 2000) (Barry, J., dissenting) cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1071 (2001).
40. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir.
1989) (the Second Circuit held that "LEXUS" did not dilute the mark "LEXIS," since only 1
percent of the general public thought of LEXIS as a mark).
41. Andrew M. Gold, Gold on Trademark Parody, Survey Evidence and Dilution by
Tarnishment in Smith v. Wal-Mart, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2008), 2008 EMERGING
ISSUES 2540 (citing Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260 (4th
Cir. 2007)).
42. Id.
43. David H. Bernstein and Thomas H. Prochnow, Defense to Infringement - When the First
Amendment Protects Trademark Parodies, 4 No. 11 INTEL. PROP. STRATEGIST 1 (1998)
(hereinafter Bernstein and Prochnow).
44. id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. Bernstein gives as example two cases in which the courts reached opposite
conclusions. Compare Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987)
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988) (holding that the defendant's T-shirts featuring the words
"Mutant of Omaha" and "Nuclear Holocaust Insurance" were likely to be confused with the
plaintiff's famous "Mutual of Omaha" service mark, the court rejected defendant's First
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least First Amendment protection because they do not implicate First
Amendment issues so directly.4 8
The issue of commercial parodies arises in at least two different
contexts. First, a purported parodist can attempt to "free ride" off the name
and goodwill of a famous mark and use the parody to disguise its intent to
sell its own products or services.4 9 Bernstein and Prochnow point to Saks
& Co. v. Hill, where the defendant used the name "Sack's Thrift Avenue"
for a used clothing shop and the court found that the parody diluted the
plaintiffs famous "Saks Fifth Avenue" mark and was likely to cause
confusion. 50 The court seemed to have relied on the lack of any legitimate
First Amendment interest in the name "Sack's Thrift Avenue" to find that
defendant had simply attempted to free ride off the goodwill established by
the plaintiff.5 I Other courts have issued injunctions in cases involving a
diaper bag with green and red bands and the wording "Gucchi Goo," which
poked fun at the famous Gucci name and the design mark,5 2 and the use on
a meat sauce of the trademark "A.2" as a "pun" on the famous "A. 1" steak
sauce.5 3 Similarly, posters bearing the logo "Enjoy Cocaine" were found to
violate the rights of Coca-Cola in the slogan "Enjoy Coca-Cola.54
However, in other cases commercial parody was a successful defense.
For example, in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
B.E. Windows Corp., the court rejected the tarnishment claim that Ringling
Brothers brought against the owner of "The Greatest Bar on Earth" for
linking the circus' name to an adult establishment where alcohol is
served. 55 But it did so, because "alcohol [was] served at some of the
venues where the circus perform[ed], and some of Ringling's restaurant
sponsors also s[old] alcohol., 56
Moreover, the two marks were

Amendment argument, in part because it drew a distinction between T-shirts and more traditional
expressive media, such as books, magazines and films), with Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 969 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding no likelihood of confusion

between the official major league baseball players association and a set of parody trading cards
featuring imaginary baseball players such as "Ken Spiffy, Jr." and "Egotistically Henderson."
The court held that although trading cards might not be as close to the core of free speech
protection, "Cardtoons' parody trading cards receive full protection under the First Amendment.")
48. Id.
49. See Saks & Co. v. Hill, 843 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Cal. 1993), appeal dismissed, 65 F.3d
175 (9th Cir. 1995) (the defendant parodied the plaintiffs famous "Sacks Fifth Avenue" mark in
its store's name "Sack's Thrift Avenue.")
50. Id. at 625.
51. Bernstein and Prochnow, supra note 43.
52. Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
53. Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Kaye, 760 F. Supp. 25, 29 (D. Conn. 1991).
54. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1192 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
55. 937 F. Supp. 204, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
56.

Id.
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insufficiently similar for dilution to occur.57 It is important to note that,
unlike in Ringling Bros., in Louis Vuitton the Chewy Vuiton dog toys are
arguably similar to the Luis Vuitton dog luxury apparel.58
The second place commercial parody arises is in the advertisement
context. In this context distinctions should be made between several
scenarios. Parody in comparative advertising is most likely protected by
the First Amendment and not is not diluting the famous mark. Similarly,
parodies of advertisements for the purpose of poking fun at others'
trademarks are not actionable under a dilution theory. For example, in L.L.
Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., the defendant published an article
entitled "L.L. Beam's Back-to-School Sex Catalog" under the humor
section of its magazine. 59 The article included pictures of nude models in
outdoor settings using products similar to those advertised in the plaintiff's
popular catalog. 60 The First Circuit held that the defendant's parody was
not a dilution of the plaintiff's trademark, and noted that the article was a
one-time use of the plaintiffs mark and that it occurred in an "editorial or
artistic" context. 61 The First Circuit seemed to suggest that dilution should
be restricted to clearly commercial contexts where the defendant uses the
plaintiff s mark in connection with goods or services that are inferior to, or
otherwise incompatible with, the plaintiff s goods or services.62
By contrast, an advertisement run parodying another's trademark for
the purpose of selling one's own products raises doubts as to the merits of a
First Amendment protection argument. For instance, in White v. Samsung
Electronics America, Inc., the Ninth Circuit distinguished the case at bar
from Hustler Magazine v. Falwe163 and L.L. Bean:
Those cases involved parodies of advertisements run for the
purpose of poking fun at Jerry Falwell and L.L. Bean,
respectively. This case involves a true advertisement run for the
purpose of selling Samsung VCRs. The ad's spoof of Vanna
White and Wheel of Fortune is subservient and only tangentially
related to the ad's primary message: "buy Samsung VCRs."
Defendants' parody arguments are better addressed to non-

57.
58.
2006).
59.

Id.
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 464 F. Supp. 2d 495 (E.D.Va.
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 27 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 483

U.S. 1013 (1987).
60. Id.
61. Id.at33-34.
62. Id. at 31.
63. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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commercial parodies. The difference between a "parody" and a
"knock-off' is the difference between fun and profit.6'
D. Louis Vuitton MalletierS.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC
In one of the first cases under the TDRA, Louis Vuitton Malletier
S.A., a French manufacturer of luxury handbags and accessories sued
Haute Diggity Dog LLC, a Nevada manufacturer of pet products. 65 Louis
Vuitton alleged that Haute Diggity Dog's brand of "Chewy Vuiton" dog
toys diluted the famous "Louis Vuitton" mark and its recognizable stylized
"LV" monogram. 66 Notwithstanding the clear similarities between the
designs, the district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on all of the plaintiffs claims. 67 The court based its decision
partly on its assessment of the dog toy as a humorous parody.68
On appeal, the International Trademark Association ("INTA") has
submitted an amicus brief in support of remand in this case.69 INTA
argued that the district court improperly ignored the plain language of the
fair use exclusion. In support to this argument, INTA pointed that: 1) Not
every parody is protected by the fair use exclusion, and 2) No fair use
exclusion operates if the trademark is used as designation of source for
goods and services.7 ° INTA further argued that the district court erred by
failing to analyze factors for likelihood of dilution by blurring. 1 In this
respect, INTA pointed that: 1) parody is a potential, not an automatic,
exclusion of liability, and 2) the court must consider whether the parody
causes an association that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.72
The Fourth Circuit granted review.73 It recognized that the district
court erred in not applying the six factors established by Congress in the
TDRA, but still concluded that there was no dilution.74 Interestingly, in its
application of the six factors, the court inserted a parody analysis, stating
64. 971 F2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992).
65. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 464 F. Supp. 2d 495 (E.D.Va.
2006).
66. Id. at 507.
67. Id. at 497.
68. Id. at 499 (citing Tommy Hilfiger Licensing v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410,
416 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
69. Brief for INTA as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A
v. Haute Diggity Dog, LCC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007), also available at http://www.inta.org
/downloads/brief INTALV.pdf.

70. Id. at 7.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 18.
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A v. Haute Diggity Dog, LCC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 265-66.
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that although parody is not a complete defense under the TDRA when a
mark is used for commercial purposes, it does not preclude the court from
considering parody as part of the dilution analysis. 75 On the first TDRA
factor, the degree of similarity between the marks, the court reasoned that
similarities between the parody and the famous mark are insignificant
unless the parody is so similar to the famous mark that it "could be
construed as actual use of the famous mark itself., 76 Some argue that,
given the phonetic and visual similarities between Louis Vuitton's marks
and the Chewy Vuiton mark with its imitation "CV" monogramming, the
court's ruling on the necessary degree of similarity would seem to construe
that factor so narrowly as to require a dilutive mark to be identical to a
famous mark.77 The court conceded that the second, third and fourth
factors favored Louis Vuitton since "LVM's marks are distinctive, famous
and strong. ' '78 In applying the fifth and sixth factor-the intent to create an
association with the famous mark and the existence of any actual
association-the court stated that a parody always intentionally creates an
association but if it proves successful, the parody will communicate that it
is a satire rather than the famous mark.79
For its parody analysis, the court used the test articulated by it in
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney ("PETA"). 80
Under the PETA test, a successful parody must convey two simultaneous
and contradictory messages: That it is the original, but also that it is not the
original and is instead a parody. This second message must not only
differentiate the alleged parody from the original but must also
communicate some articulable element of satire, ridicule, joking or
amusement. The court found that the "Chewy Vuiton dog toys were an
"immediate" and "unmistakable" parody that "irreverently presents haute
couture as an object for casual canine destruction." 8' Notably, the court
engaged in an extensive presentation of the satiric aspects to justify its
finding:
The furry little "Chewy Vuiton" imitation, as something to be
chewed by a dog, pokes fun at the elegance and expensiveness of a

75. Id. at 266-67.
76. Id. at 267-268.
77. Mayer Brown, Intellectual Property Update, Death by Dog Toy: Is Dilution Dead After
Chewy Vuiton?, available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=416 1&
nid=6, January 28, 2008. (hereinafter Mayer Brown).
78. Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 267.
79. Id. at 267-268.
80. 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001)
81. 507 F.3d. at 261.
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LOUIS VUITTON handbag, which must not be chewed by a dog.
The LVM handbag is provided for the most elegant and well-to-do
celebrity, to proudly display to the public and the press, whereas
the imitation "Chewy Vuiton" "handbag" is designed to mock the
celebrity and be used by a dog. The dog toy irreverently presents
haute couture as an object for casual canine destruction. The satire
is unmistakable. The dog toy is a comment on the rich and
famous, on the LOUIS VUITTON name and related marks and on
conspicuous consumption in general. This parody is enhanced by
the fact that "Chewy Vuiton" dog toys are sold with similar
parodies of other famous and expensive brands-"Chewnel No. 5"
targeting "Chanel No. 5"; "Dog Perignonn" targeting "Dom
82
Perignon"; and "Sniffany & Co." targeting "Tiffany & Co.
As discussed below, this case raises the issue of whether courts should
allow parody as a successful defense in all cases of commercial uses. It
also signals the concern that allowing primarily commercial purposes to
hide behind a parody defense undermines anti-dilution law.
E. Free Riding as a Form of Dilution
In Ty v. Perryman, in an opinion intertwined with economic analysis,
Judge Richard Posner reviewed the purpose of trademark law, and the
nature of consumer confusion and various forms of dilution.83 Ty, a
manufacturer of beanbag stuffed animals and holder of "Beanie Babies"
trademark brought an infringement action against Perryman, who sold
second-hand beanbag stuffed animals over the Internet at
bargainbeanies.com. 84 The district court granted summary judgment for Ty
and Perryman appealed. 85 The Court of Appeals held that: (1) use of
bargainbeanies.com was not a violation of the federal anti-dilution statute
or Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 6 and (2) injunction that
prohibited seller from using "Beanie" or "Beanies" in connection with any
products not associated with holder of trademark "Beanie Babies" was
warranted.8 7 Judge Posner noted that "[t]he fundamental purpose of a
trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by providing a concise and
unequivocal identifier of the particular source of particular goods."8 8 Judge
82.
83.

Id.
306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002).

84. Id. at 510.
85. Id.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 514.
Id.
Id. at510.
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Posner explained that this aspect of trademark law gives trademark owners
and incentive to consistently provide good quality goods in order to protect
their investment and secure their goodwill. 89 He cautioned that a successful
brand creates an incentive in inferior competitors to appropriate the
goodwill of the successful brand by adopting a confusingly similar
trademark in order to "pass off their inferior brand as the successful
brand." 90
In an attempt to clarify the concept of dilution, Judge Posner
enumerated three possibilities, each defined by a different underlying
concern. First, "the concern that consumer search costs will rise if a
trademark becomes associated with a variety of unrelated products"
underlies Posner's economic definition of blurring. 9 1 For example, if the
Nike brand "swoosh" symbol were used on goods unrelated to and not in
competition with Nike's footwear and apparel, consumers would not be
confused as to source, but the Nike's logo would lose its distinctive
nature.92 Second, dilution by tarnishment occurs where, "because of the
inveterate tendency of the human mind to proceed by association" a mark
may be "tarnished by the association of the word" with its use by someone
who is selling a non-competing product.9 3
Judge Posner suggested a third type of dilution, free riding. In his
view, free riding is the most far reaching in its implications for the scope of
the concept of dilution, because of the possible concern with situations in
which, although there is neither blurring nor tarnishment, "someone is still
taking a free ride on the investment of the trademark owner in the
trademark. 9 4 In this situation, "the efficacy of the trademark as an
identifier will not be impaired., 95 Judge Posner offered a possible rationale
for such a theory. If the trademark owner has a dilution claim, then the
"investment in creating a famous name will be, as economists say,
'internalized"' meaning that the owner will realize the full benefits of the
investment rather than sharing those benefits with others, and as a result the
amount of investing in creating a prestigious name will rise.96 In Ty, Judge
Posner found that none of the anti-dilution rationales applied because
Perryman was selling the very product to which the Ty's trademark was
attached. Judge Posner concluded that what Ty was seeking was "an
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Ty v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 511.

Id.
Id.
Id. at512.
Id.
Id. at 512.
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extension of antidilution law to forbid commercial uses that accelerate the
transition from trademarks (brand names) to generic names (product
names)." 97 Judge Posner reasoned that although there is a social cost when
a mark becomes generic because the trademark owner has to invest in a
new trademark to identify his brand, there is also a social benefit, namely
an addition to ordinary language." 98 He urged that an interpretation of
antidilution law as arming trademark owners to enjoin uses of their mark
that, while not confusing, threaten to render the mark generic may therefore
not be in the public interest and may open the doors to excessive litigation
99
on this dilution theory.
III. Analysis
A. The Parallel Concept of 'Parasitic Exploitation' in the European
Union and South America
The European Union ("E.U.") follows the 1988 E.U. Trademark
Directive. The antidilution provisions of Articles 4(4)(a) and 5(2) of the
E.U Directive are optional but the majority of E.U. nations have adopted
them in their domestic law.100 The European "unfair advantage" cause of
action created in the European Directive on the Harmonization of
Trademark Law is an alternative basis of liability for trademark dilution. l1
Article 4(4)(a) of the Directive allows European Union member states to
refuse registration to trademarks that would take unfair advantage of the
reputation of a mark that has already been registered or is to be registered
within their territory. 10 2 Further, Article 5(2) of the Directive states that
Member States may entitle trademark owners to enjoin the use of marks
103
that would take unfair advantage of the reputation of their marks.

97.

Id.at 513.

98. Id.
99. Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1989.
100. Case 292/00, Davidoff& Cie SA v. Gofkid Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. 1-389, [2003] 1 C.M.L.R.
35, para. AG7 (2003) (involving the owner of the mark DAVIDOFF, which was registered and
used on jewelry and smokers' articles, and its attempt to prevent the registration and use in
Germany of the mark DURFEE for similar goods).
101. Council Directive 89/104/EEC, art. 4(4)(a), 1989.
102. Id. "Any member State may provide that a trade mark shall not be registered or, if
registered, shall be liable to be declared invalid where, and to the extent that: the trade mark that
is identical with, or similar to, an earlier national trade mark... and is to be, or has been,
registered for goods or services which are not similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is
registered, where the earlier trade mark has a reputation in the Member State concerned and
where the use of the later trade mark without due cause would take unfair advantage of, or be
detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark."
103. Id. art 5(2). "Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to
prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade any sign which is
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In Davidoff & Cie S.A. v. Gofkid Ltd. and Adidas-Salomon AG v.
FitnessworldTrading Ltd., the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") held that
the anti-dilution law is an overarching legal remedy applicable to any and
all situations, whether the goods and services are competitive, similar, or
non-similar. 0 4 The ECJ interpretation reflects a tendency for a more
flexible protection.
Indeed, protection for famous marks in the European Union is more
flexible. For instance, in a landmark judgment for L'Oreal and Lanc6me
referred to the ECJ for further interpretation of European trademark law
issues, Lord Justice Blackburne commented:
While I agree that European trademark law should not be
overprotective, ... where a person is able to derive a commercial
advantage through the "wink" which his product makes at the
registered mark but no harm, present or prospective, can be shown
to that mark, its distinctive character, or to the mark owner or his
business... I can well see why such conduct, assuming that it
gives to the person 0in5 question a commercial advantage, should be
treated as "unfair."'
In Germany, any slavish imitation leading to an impediment of a
competitor is forbidden. Even if there is no confusion of origin, a so called
"parasitic exploitation of another's achievement" can result in a violation
06
of the law. 1
Similarly, Article 48 of the Commercial Code of the Slovak Republic
states that exploiting the reputation of another competitor's enterprise,
products or services, with the aim of gaining extra benefit for one's own or
someone else's business, shall be considered parasitic exploitation of a
identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are not similar
to those for which the trade mark is registered, where the [trade mark] has a reputation in the
Member State concerned and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of,
or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark."
104. Id. para 30; Adidas-Salomon v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., 1 C.M.L.R. 14, para. 20
(holding that the EU Trademark Directive must "grant protection which is at least as extensive for
identical or similar goods or services as for non-similar goods or services").
105. Baker & McKenzie, News, Press Release Archive, October 10, 2007,
http://www.bakemet.com/BakerNet/News/Archive/2007/LandmarkIPECJ.htm.
(The two issues
referred to the ECJ were: (1) When can a business use the well-known trademarks of a competitor
on comparison lists to promote its own products, and (2) When does infringement of well-known
marks occur if consumer confusion is absent.)
106. Taylor Wessing, Doing Business in Germany- How to Protect your Intellectual
Property, availableat http://www.taylorwessing.com/website/generator/taylorwessing/content
/publications/items/Germany/IPDoingBusinessInGermanyTWG
enBrochure.de,property-f
ile.pdf.
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competitor's reputation. 0 7 The Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic
stated: "A condition of committing unfair competition through the parasitic
exploitation of a competitor's reputation is an existence of such
reputation ... and it must be intentional conduct with the aim of gaining
8
10

benefit."'
Even in South America, famous marks benefit from higher protection
than that allowed to Louis Vuitton in United States. The Brazilian Patents
and Trademarks Office, recognized marks like "Pirelli, "McDonalds,"
"Visa," "Hollywood," "Natura," "Cica" and "Ninho" as highly renowned
marks. 10 9 In a large majority of cases the Special Commission ruled that
the marks in question were highly renowned, concluding that the fame and
reputation established by the mark "make it economically attractive," and
for this reason deserve higher protection, meaning "special protection in all
classes of goods and services."' 10 This rationale is exactly at the opposite
end of the spectrum in relation with the court's rationale in Luis Vuitton. In
Luis Vuitton, the fact that Luis Vuitton was a famous mark which also
produced a limited series of luxury dog apparel was a reason for the court
to find that the mark's distinctiveness was less likely to be impaired by
Chewy Vuitton dog toys."' In another notable case, the Brazilian Federal
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision in favor of the
French Institute for Designations of Origin of Wines and Spirits canceling
registration of the "Bordeaux" mark filed by the defendant and appellee,
Bordeaux Buffet S.A., in the food service segment. 12 The decision was
based on the understanding that, since Bordeaux was a name designating a
renowned wine-producing region, its use to identify food and ice services
which are closely related to beverages, would be considered parasitic
exploitation. 113

107. Andrea Pova~anovA, Recent Developments in Intellectual Property Law, available at
http://www.buildingipvalue.com/05_EU/285_287.htm.
108. Id.
109. Ana Lucia de Sousa Borda, Highly Renowned Marks -Criteria Adopted by the BPRTO
for their recognition, DANNEMANN SIEMSEN NEWS, No. 11 December 2005, available at
http://www.dannemann.com.br/files/dsnews_200512_en.pdf.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A v. Haute Diggity Dog, LCC, 507 F.3d 252, 267 (4th Cir.
2007).
112. Case 96-0224177-2, August 30, 2005; Jose Correa and Rodrigo Careniro, The Bordeaux
Case, DANNEMANN SIEMSEN NEWS,
No.
11
December 2005, available at,
http://www.darnemann.com.br/files/dsnews_200512_en.pdf.
113. Jose Correa and Rodrigo Careniro, The Bordeaux Case, DANNEMANN SIEMSEN NEWS,
No.
II
December 2005,
available at, http://www.dannemann.com.br/files/dsnews
_200512_en.pdf.
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B.

TDRA Interpretation Challenges Reflected in the Fourth Circuit
Decision in Louis Vuitton.
The Fourth Circuit decision in Louis Vuitton reflects the challenges
TDRA poses to courts in adjudicating dilution claims when the alleged
free-rider invokes the parody fair use defense. Critics argue that the court's
determination undercuts the TDRA's attempt to introduce a degree of
objectivity into the dilution analysis by adding specific factors designed to
enhance consistency among dilution decisions. 14 The Fourth Circuit
Decision extends the First Amendment immunization granted to noncommercial parodies in Section 1125 (c)(3)(A) to commercial uses of
famous marks so long as the
defendant can fashion some argument that it is
15
using a mark as a parody."
While the court's finding of a successful parody appears plausible, it
does not necessarily follow that similar cases will have similar outcomes.
For instance, in a similar case, Conopco Inc. v. 3DO Co., the court upheld
an injunction against the use of "Snuggle the Bear" in a video game called
"BattleTanx: Global Assault."' "16 In the video game, the popular fluffy bear
used to advertise fabric softener was subjected to being chased, burned,
trampled, and shot at. 1 7 3DO argued that such use was intended to
"parody the existence of the Snuggle Bear-like world" by juxtaposing it
with elements of a battle game. 18 The court found that such use had the
potential to harm Snuggle's brand image." 9 Thus, it appears that in
applying the TDRA courts have wide latitude in finding a parody defense
successful, leaving litigants with little guidance in predicting the outcome
of their case. As shown in the proposal below, a more objective test is
desirable.
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit focused only on the Louis Vuitton
handbags and the purported parodic effect aimed at the consumerism
espoused by the celebrities carrying the bags, and disregarded the fact that
Luis Vuitton marketed itself a limited selection of luxury pet accessories.120
Thus, one could argue that the Chewy Vuiton dog toys are not so obviously
immediately expressing humor to the consumer.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

2007).

Mayer Brown, supra note 77, at 3.
Id.
Conopco, Inc. v. 3DO Co., 53 U.S.P.Q. 3d 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A v. Haute Diggity Dog, LCC, 507 F.3d 252, 258 (4th Cir.
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The Fourth Circuit admitted that the defendant's use of a parody as a
mark does not support a fair use defense.
However, by considering it in
determining whether Louis Vuitton has proved its dilution claim that
defendant's use of a parody mark was likely to impair the distinctiveness of
Louis Vuitton mark, the court ignored the essential purpose of anti-dilution
legislation and did allow in fact the defendant to successfully cloak its
primarily commercial use in a fair use defense. The distinctiveness of a
famous mark is but one concern of anti-dilution legislation. While the
injury resulting from dilution involves the whittling away of a mark's
distinctiveness or the tarnishing of a mark's reputation, "the overriding
purpose of anti-dilution legislation is to prohibit a merchant of
noncompetitive goods from selling its products by trading on the goodwill
and reputation of another's mark."'' 22 Thus, consistent with the more
protective European and South American legislation, the protection of a
famous mark against free riding emerges as a legitimate concern having the
potential of steering the law's object and purpose in a new direction.
C. Economic Reasons to Prevent Free Riding on the Fame of Other's
Trademarks for One's Own Economic Benefit
Opponents of this position argue that First Amendment concerns
justify allowing a parody defense even in the case of commercial
trademarks parodies. 23 More specifically, they argue that the TDRA
threatens free speech and enable the restriction of organized corporate
criticism by expanding liability through the acceptance of a "likelihood"
standard of proof, enshrinement of "dilution by tamishment" and a free
speech exception that does not
unambiguously provide a sufficient
24
safeguard for protected speech. 1
On the other hand, supporters of an anti-free riding approach advance
strong anti-dilution arguments. For instance, the Lockean labor theory 1of
25
property rights posits that one deserves to own the fruits of his labor.
Thus, the Lockean labor theory supports the position our intuition that
famous mark owners deserve to own and control marks which they made
famous and to capture the economic benefits that they generate. 2 6
121. Id. at267.
122. L.L.Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc. 811 F.3d 894, 903 (1st Cir. 1987).
123. See Jesse A. Hofrichter, Tool of the Trademark: Brand Criticism and Free Speech
Problems with the TrademarkDilution Revision Act of 2006, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1923 (2007).
124. Id. at 1930.
125. David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the
Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117, 140 (2004)
(arguing for a anti-free-riding cause of action, independent of dilution considerations)(hereinafter,
David J. Franklyn).
126. Id.
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Similarly, the economic incentive theory1 27 formulated by Judge
Posner, assumes that free-riding prevents a famous mark owner from
capturing the full financial benefits of his mark. 128 This is what economists
refer to as internalizing the benefits of creating a famous name. 129 On the
other tip of the balance, the free-rider does not further innovation or
technological advancement, and does not offer any other countervailing
economic benefit to society.130
Furthermore, some supporters of stronger trademark protection go
even further to argue that famous owners should be able to protect their
trademarks against unjustified free riding without having to prove that that
those marks were losing commercial magnetism or selling power due to the
defendant's activities."13
D. The Parody Fair Use Defense was Envisioned to Address First
Amendment Concerns, Not to Disguise Free-Riding Attempts.
In Congress's attempt to balance First Amendment Rights with
famous mark owners' rights, the TDRA protects some forms of parody.
However, the TDRA does expose certain forms of parody to dilution
liability. Specifically, the Act does exclude some conduct as "not
actionable." 132 This includes all non-commercial use of a mark and news
reporting. Also, the language of the TDRA excludes from dilution liability
"any fair use. .. of a famous mark by another person other than as a
designation of sourcefor the person's own goods and services."'33 Such
fair use extends to "nominative or descriptive fair use," comparative
advertising, and "identifying 134
and parodying, criticizing or commenting
upon the famous mark owner."
Although this language arguably limits the parody defense to nontrademark uses, as the Fourth Circuit decision in Louis Vuitton clearly
signals, courts are nevertheless
willing to accept it as a defense to a
135
trademark dilution claim.

127. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 267, 268 (1988).
128. See Ty v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002).
129. Id. at 512-13.
130. David J. Franklyn, supra note 125, at 142.
131. David J. Franklin, Beyond Dilution: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free Rider
Impulse in American Trademark Law, available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/58/.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 1225 (c) (3).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1225 (c) (3) (A) (emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A v. Haute Diggity Dog, LCC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir.
2007).
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Furthermore, the specific language of the TDRA demonstrates that
Congress did not intend to immunize commercial uses of highly similar
marks used to designate a source whenever a defendant can make some
argument that such use is protected social commentary. Nevertheless, as
the critics of the Fourth Circuit expansive interpretation and application of
the parody defense to "Chewy Vuiton" dog toys warn, trademark owners
must ponder whether the dilution cause of action has any bite left when
they attack allegedly parodic uses of their marks under the TDRA.136
IV. Proposal
The specific language of the TDRA demonstrates that Congress did
not intend to immunize commercial uses of highly similar marks to
designate a source whenever a defendant can make some argument that
such use is protected social commentary. However, courts still struggle
with this language mainly because of their concern with protecting First
Amendment rights. First Amendment concerns are much stronger in the
non-commercial context, because the parodist's primary purpose is to
express an idea, than in the commercial context, in which often the selfproclaimed "parodist" uses the "parody" of the mark in association with its
own products.
To properly balance freedom of speech rights with the property
interests of the famous marks owners, the courts should only protect
trademark parodies in which expression and not commercial exploitation or
free riding is the primary intent. In looking at a particular case, the courts
should inquire whether the intention of the purported parodist is primarily
commercial use or social commentary. However, simply because the
parodist has an economic motivation should not render his speech purely
commercial. The test should be whether the purported parodist acted
substantially out of economic motivation. In practice, this could be
signaled by the existence, extent and variety of the parodist's business
transactions, profit margin, and advertising. Conversely, where the primary
intent of the parodist is to express himself, and commercial success is only
incidental or a secondary motive at most, a dilution claim should be
unsuccessful. While a finding of parody is likely post-facto by applying
the PETA test as the Fourth Circuit decision in Louis Vuitton illustrates, it
does not necessarily result that the parodist's primary intent, was to simply
comment and not to free ride on the fame of the mark he pokes fun at.
More objective findings like the economic considerations enumerated
above are likely to be more accurate indicators of the parodist's primary
intent and would lead to more predictable outcomes when the parodist and
136.

Meyer Brown, supra note 77, at 3.
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the famous mark owner confront each other in court. Furthermore, this test
would result in more uniform decisions that would align United States
jurisprudence with the more protective European and South American
jurisprudence which recognize the economic value of a famous trademark.
V. Conclusion
This note attempted to explore the possibility that courts, by broadly
interpreting the TDRA as being designed to protect freedom of speech,
allow free riders to hide behind commercial parodies and make money by
exploiting the reputation of famous marks. It further attempted to
formulate a more objective test to distinguish the blurred line between
parody-disguised free-riding and freedom of speech and to provide
prospective litigants with greater predictability.
A more flexible protection of famous marks in Europe and South
America, as well as strong economic considerations in preventing freeriding on the trademarks of others for one's own commercial interest,
outweigh First Amendment concerns in the context of primarily
commercial uses. Parodies should be a successful defense only when their
primary purpose is social commentary rather than commercial exploitation
of a famous mark.
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